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Our results demonstrate that SABRE is effective at securing Bitcoin against routing attacks, even with deployments of as few as 6 nodes. Simple path tracing tools such as traceroute allow malicious users to infer network topologies remotely and use that knowledge to craft advanced denial-of-service DoS attacks such as Link-Flooding Attacks LFAs. Yet, despite the risk, most network operators still allow path tracing as it is an essential network debugging tool.

In this paper, we present NetHide, a network topology obfuscation framework that mitigates LFAs while preserving the practicality of path tracing tools.

The key idea behind NetHide is to formulate network obfuscation as a multi-objective optimization problem that allows for a flexible tradeoff between security encoded as hard constraints and usability encoded as soft constraints. While solving this problem exactly is hard, we show that NetHide can obfuscate topologies at scale by only considering a subset of the candidate solutions and without reducing obfuscation quality.

In practice, NetHide obfuscates the topology by intercepting and modifying path tracing probes directly in the data plane. We show that this process can be done at line-rate, in a stateless fashion, by leveraging the latest generation of programmable network devices.

We fully implemented NetHide and evaluated it on realistic topologies. Tallinn, Estonia May Organizations not only need to defend their IT systems against external cyber attackers, but also from malicious insiders, that is, agents who have infiltrated an organization or malicious members stealing information for their own profit.

In particular, malicious insiders can leak a document by simply opening it and taking pictures of the document displayed on the computer screen with a digital camera. Using a digital camera allows a perpetrator to easily avoid a log trail that results from using traditional communication channels, such as sending the document via email. This makes it difficult to identify and prove the identity of the perpetrator. Even a policy prohibiting the use of any device containing a camera cannot eliminate this threat since tiny cameras can be hidden almost everywhere.

To address this leakage vector, we propose a novel screen watermarking technique that embeds hidden information on computer screens displaying text documents. The watermark is imperceptible during regular use, but can be extracted from pictures of documents shown on the screen, which allows an organization to reconstruct the place and time of the data leak from recovered leaked pictures.

Our approach takes advantage of the fact that the human eye is less sensitive to small luminance changes than digital cameras. We devise a symbol shape that is invisible to the human eye, but still robust to the image artifacts introduced when taking pictures. We complement this symbol shape with an error correction coding scheme that can handle very high bit error rates and retrieve watermarks from cropped and compressed pictures.

We show in an experimental user study that our screen watermarks are not perceivable by humans and analyze the robustness of our watermarks against image modifications.

Organizations increasingly rely on cyber threat intelligence feeds to protect their infrastructure from attacks. These feeds typically list IP addresses or domains associated with malicious activities such as spreading malware or participating in a botnet. Today, there is a rich ecosystem of commercial and free cyber threat intelligence feeds, making it difficult, yet essential, for network defenders to quantify the quality and to select the optimal set of feeds to follow.

Selecting too many or low-quality feeds results in many false alerts, while considering too few feeds increases the risk of missing relevant threats. In this paper, we present FeedRank, a novel ranking approach for cyber threat intelligence feeds. In contrast to individual metrics, FeedRank is robust against tampering attempts by feed providers.

We evaluate FeedRank based on a large set of real feeds. The evaluation shows that FeedRank identifies dishonest feeds as outliers and that dishonest feeds do not achieve a better FeedRank score than the top-rated real feeds. DIMVA Bonn, Germany July These APTs had been used against several hundred organizations for years without being detected.

As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself.

Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements BGP hijacks or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems ASes can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole.

While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: i the efficiency of routing manipulation; and ii the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing.

We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending.

To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately. Advances in layer 2 networking technologies have fostered the deployment of large, geographically distributed LANs.

Due to their large diameter, such LANs provide many vantage points for wiretapping. As an example, Google's internal network was reportedly tapped by governmental agencies, forcing the Web giant to encrypt its internal traffic. While using encryption certainly helps, eavesdroppers can still access traffic metadata which often reveals sensitive information, such as who communicates with whom and which are the critical hubs in the infrastructure.

This paper presents iTAP, a system for providing strong anonymity guarantees within a network. As large LANs can see millions of flows, the key challenge is to rewrite headers in a way that guarantees strong anonymity while, at the same time, scaling the control-plane number of events and the data-plane number of flow rules.

Specifically, iTAP scales by reusing rewriting rules across distinct flows and by distributing them on multiple switches. As reusing headers leaks information, iTAP monitors this leakage and adapts the rewriting rules before any eavesdropper could provably de-anonymize any host. We implemented iTAP and evaluated it using real network traffic traces.

We show that iTAP works in practice, on existing hardware, and that deploying few SDN switches is enough to protect a large share of the network traffic. Washington, D. Anonymity systems like Tor are known to be vulnerable to malicious relay nodes.

Another serious threat comes from the Autonomous Systems ASes that carry Tor traffic due to their powerful eavesdropping capabilities. Indeed, an AS or set of colluding ASes that lies between the client and the first relay, and between the last relay and the destination, can perform timing analysis to compromise user anonymity.

In this paper, we show that AS-level adversaries are much more powerful than previously thought. First, routine BGP routing changes can significantly increase the number of ASes that can analyze a user's traffic successfully. Second, ASes can actively manipulate BGP announcements to put themselves on the paths to and from relay nodes. Third, an AS can perform timing analysis even when it sees only one direction of the traffic at both communication ends.

Actually, asymmetric routing increases the fraction of ASes able to analyze a user's traffic. Research in cyber security strives to find solutions to pressing security problems in computer systems, networks and their applications. It aims to provide both foundational and applied knowledge in this quickly expanding domain by leveraging expertise from the faculty in both institutions.

To complement the programme, students choose a focus area in computer science as a minor, such as computer systems, information systems, machine learning, software engineering, theoretical computer science, or visual computing.

Graduates of this programme will face excellent job perspectives. There is a high demand for cyber security experts in all areas of business and administration, as well as in research. Press Enter to activate screen reader mode.

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In Proceedings of the International Conference on Passwords Stefan Bechtold, and Adrian Perrig. In Communications of the ACM 57 9 In 39 4 Yanlin Li, Jonathan M. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University McCune, and Adrian Perrig. Visualizing Tie Strength for Trust Inference. Nelson, Marco Gruteser, and Wei Meng. Bryan Parno, Jonathan M.

Publisher: Springer Briefs in Computer Science, In Journal of Communications and Networks 13 2 In Journal of Foundations and Trends in Databases 3 3 Xin Zhang, and Adrian Perrig. Amit Vasudevan, Jonathan M. Jonathan M. Haowen Chan, and Adrian Perrig. Adrian Perrig, and Leendert van Doorn. Ahren Studer, and Adrian Perrig. In Journal of Communications and Networks 11 6 Andersen, and Adrian Perrig. Bryan Parno. Dan Wendlandt, David G. Reiter, and Hiroshi Isozaki. Reiter, and Arvind Seshadri.

Technical report, CyLab In Communications of the ACM 49 9 In ACM Interactions 13 3 Bryan Parno, and Adrian Perrig. In Wireless Networks Journal 11 1 Elaine Shi, and Adrian Perrig. In Wireless Communication Magazine 11 6 Yih-Chun Hu, and Adrian Perrig. Yih-Chun Hu, David B. Johnson, and Adrian Perrig. In Journal of Ad Hoc Networks 1 1 In Journal of Wireless Networks 8 5 Adrian Perrig, and Dawn Song. In Workshop on Human Interactive Proofs Adrian Perrig, Ran Canetti, J.

Tygar, and Dawn Song. Adrian Perrig. A series of recent studies have shown that permissionless blockchain peer-to-peer networks can be partitioned at low cost e.

In this paper, we focus on the sustainability of partitioning attacks in Bitcoin, which is barely discussed in the literature.

Existing studies investigate new partitioning attack strategies extensively but not how long the partition they create lasts. Our findings show that, fortunately for Bitcoin, the permissionless peer-to-peer network can be partitioned but only for a short time. In particular, two recent partitioning attacks i.

After analyzing Bitcoin's peer eviction mechanism which makes the two original attacks difficult to sustain , we propose optimization strategies for the two attacks and calculate the total cost of the optimized attacks for a 1-hour attack duration. Our results complement the original attack studies: i the optimized Erebus attack shows that it requires at least one adversary-controlled Bitcoin node close to a target and a few additional expensive attack steps for sustainable attacks, and ii the optimized SyncAttack can create sustainable partitions only with excessive cost.

Amsterdam, Netherlands August Pulse-wave DDoS attacks are a new type of volumetric attack consisting of short, high-rate traffic pulses. Such attacks target the Achilles' heel of state-of-the-art DDoS defenses: their reaction time.

By continuously adapting their attack vectors, pulse-wave attacks manage to render existing defenses ineffective.

In this paper, we leverage programmable switches to build an in-network DDoS defense effective against pulse-wave attacks. To do so, we revisit Aggregate-based Congestion Control ACC : a mechanism proposed twenty years ago to manage congestion events caused by high-bandwidth traffic aggregates. While ACC proved efficient in inferring and controlling DoS attacks, it cannot keep up with the speed requirements of pulse-wave attacks.

We propose ACC-Turbo, a renewed version of ACC, which infers attack patterns by applying online-clustering techniques in the network and mitigates them by using programmable packet scheduling. By doing so, ACC-Turbo can infer attacks at line rate and in real-time; and rate-limit attack traffic on a per-packet basis. NDSS Symposium Many large organizations operate dedicated wide area networks WANs distinct from the Internet to connect their data centers and remote sites through high-throughput links.

While encryption generally protects these WANs well against content eavesdropping, they remain vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks that infer visited websites, watched videos or contents of VoIP calls from analysis of the traffic volume, packet sizes or timing information. Existing techniques to obfuscate Internet traffic are not well suited for WANs as they are either highly inefficient or require modifications to the communication protocols used by end hosts.

This paper presents ditto, a traffic obfuscation system adapted to the requirements of WANs: achieving high-throughput traffic obfuscation at line rate without modifications of end hosts. We evaluate a full implementation of ditto running on programmable switches in the network data plane. Our results show that ditto runs at Gbps line rate and performs with negligible performance overhead up to a realistic traffic load of 70 Gbps per WAN link.

Communications of the ACM. June Attacks on Internet routing are typically viewed through the lens of availability and confidentiality, assuming an adversary that either discards traffic or performs eavesdropping. Yet, a strategic adversary can use routing attacks to compromise the security of critical Internet applications like Tor, certificate authorities, and the bitcoin network.

In this paper, we survey such application-specific routing attacks and argue that both application-layer and network-layer defenses are essential and urgently needed. The good news is that, while deployment challenges have hindered the adoption of network-layer defenses i. ACM HotNets Traditional network control planes can be slow and require manual tinkering from operators to change their behavior. There is thus great interest in a faster, data-driven approach that uses signals from real-time traffic instead.

However, the promise of fast and automatic reaction to data comes with new risks: malicious inputs designed towards negative outcomes for the network, service providers, users, and operators. Adversarial inputs are a well-recognized problem in other areas; we show that networking applications are susceptible to them too.

We characterize the attack surface of data-driven networks and examine how attackers with different privilegesпїЅfrom infected hosts to operator-level accessпїЅmay target network infrastructure, applications, and protocols. To illustrate the problem, we present case studies with concrete attacks on recently proposed data-driven systems.

Our analysis urgently calls for a careful study of attacks and defenses in data-driven networking, with a view towards ensuring that their promise is not marred by oversights in robust design. Nowadays Internet routing attacks remain practically effective as existing countermeasures either fail to provide protection guarantees or are not easily deployable. Blockchain systems are particularly vulnerable to such attacks as they rely on Internet-wide communications to reach consensus.

In particular, Bitcointhe most widely-used cryptocurrencycan be split in half by any AS-level adversary using BGP hijacking. In this paper, we present SABRE, a secure and scalable Bitcoin relay network which relays blocks worldwide through a set of connections that are resilient to routing attacks. SABRE runs alongside the existing peer-to-peer network and is easily deployable. As a critical system, SABRE design is highly resilient and can efficiently handle high bandwidth loads, including Denial of Service attacks.

First, we leverage fundamental properties of inter-domain routing BGP policies to host relay nodes: i in networks that are inherently protected against routing attacks; and ii on paths that are economically-preferred by the majority of Bitcoin clients. These properties are generic and can be used to protect other Blockchain-based systems.

Second, we leverage the fact that relaying blocks is communication-heavy, not computation-heavy. This enables us to offload most of the relay operations to programmable network hardware using the P4 programming language. Our results demonstrate that SABRE is effective at securing Bitcoin against routing attacks, even with deployments of as few as 6 nodes. Simple path tracing tools such as traceroute allow malicious users to infer network topologies remotely and use that knowledge to craft advanced denial-of-service DoS attacks such as Link-Flooding Attacks LFAs.

Yet, despite the risk, most network operators still allow path tracing as it is an essential network debugging tool. In this paper, we present NetHide, a network topology obfuscation framework that mitigates LFAs while preserving the practicality of path tracing tools. The key idea behind NetHide is to formulate network obfuscation as a multi-objective optimization problem that allows for a flexible tradeoff between security encoded as hard constraints and usability encoded as soft constraints.

While solving this problem exactly is hard, we show that NetHide can obfuscate topologies at scale by only considering a subset of the candidate solutions and without reducing obfuscation quality. In practice, NetHide obfuscates the topology by intercepting and modifying path tracing probes directly in the data plane. We show that this process can be done at line-rate, in a stateless fashion, by leveraging the latest generation of programmable network devices.

We fully implemented NetHide and evaluated it on realistic topologies. Tallinn, Estonia May Organizations not only need to defend their IT systems against external cyber attackers, but also from malicious insiders, that is, agents who have infiltrated an organization or malicious members stealing information for their own profit. In particular, malicious insiders can leak a document by simply opening it and taking pictures of the document displayed on the computer screen with a digital camera.

Using a digital camera allows a perpetrator to easily avoid a log trail that results from using traditional communication channels, such as sending the document via email. This makes it difficult to identify and prove the identity of the perpetrator. Even a policy prohibiting the use of any device containing a camera cannot eliminate this threat since tiny cameras can be hidden almost everywhere.

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Crypto currency and russia	Amsterdam, Netherlands August We show that iTAP works in practice, on existing hardware, and that deploying few SDN switches is enough to protect a large share of the network traffic. There is a high demand for cyber security experts in all areas of business and administration, as well as in research. Yanlin Li, Jonathan M. Our analysis urgently calls network security eth zrich a careful study of more info and defenses in data-driven networking, with a view towards ensuring that their promise is not marred by oversights in robust design. In particular, Bitcointhe most widely-used cryptocurrencycan be split in half by any AS-level adversary using BGP hijacking. There is a high demand for cyber security experts in all areas of business and administration, as well as in research.
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Now, this presence is intimately linked to the war and to the resultant political and economic struggle. Advocacy for a rules-based order has come to define the foreign policy of various countries. What this concept entails, however, remains vague, says this CSS Analysis. The aim of this report is to provide an illustrative overview of software supply chain attacks and to raise awareness of the types of attacks, their uses, and their potential impacts. More information here. Russia attacked Ukraine.

On our website "Focus Ukraine", we update you with media and other contributions and background analyses by CSS researchers on the current situation. More information. The CSS studies the medium- and long-term consequences of the coronavirus pandemic in the framework of two research projects.

Chapter in Future Networks, Services and Management Supplemental material and code available. In Critical Information Infrastructures Security Jonghoon Kwon, Juan A. Piet De Vaere, and Adrian Perrig. Reischuk, Pawel Szalachowski, and Adrian Perrig. Sergiu Costea, Marios O. Daniele E. Asoni, Takayuki Sasaki, and Adrian Perrig. Asoni, and Adrian Perrig. Chen Chen, Daniele E.

Asoni, Samuel Hitz, and Adrian Perrig. Chen Chen, and Adrian Perrig. Reischuk, and Pawel Szalachowski. In Communications of the ACM 60 6 Benjamin Rothenberger, Daniele E. Asoni, David Barrera, and Adrian Perrig. In Proceedings of the EuroSec Pawel Szalachowski, and Adrian Perrig. Stephanos Matsumoto, Raphael M.

Reischuk, and Laurent Chuat. Technical report, ETH Zurich Takayuki Sasaki, Daniele E. Cristina Basescu, Raphael M. In Computer Networks David Barrera, Raphael M. Reischuk,, Pawel Szalachowski, and Adrian Perrig. In arXiv e-prints In Security and Communication Networks Szalachowski, Pawel, and Perrig, Adrian.

Stephanos Matsumoto, and Raphael M. Christos Pappas, Raphael M. Reischuk, and Adrian Perrig. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Passwords Stefan Bechtold, and Adrian Perrig. In Communications of the ACM 57 9 In 39 4 Yanlin Li, Jonathan M.

Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University McCune, and Adrian Perrig. Visualizing Tie Strength for Trust Inference. Nelson, Marco Gruteser, and Wei Meng.